



INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

# The Debate on the EU Membership Prospects of Ukraine

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RESEARCH REPORTS · POLICY PAPERS

# The Debate on the EU Membership Prospects of Ukraine\*

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*“Noted Western analysts are still debating whether the Orange Revolution was a revolution per se or simply a spectacular phase in the unfinished Ukrainian revolution of 1991. This question makes no sense to me because what really matters is the essence, not a formal definition. **The Orange Revolution did more than rediscover Ukraine for the world that had forgotten all about it. Most importantly, this revolution discovered the Ukraine for us. We turned capable of fighting for our rights, of making sacrifices, and even of showing mercy to the defeated enemy”***

Maksym STRIKHA, Ph.D., Ukrainian writer

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## 1. Introduction

European integration has been on Ukraine's agenda since its independence. There has been a period identified as 'integration without Europeanization'<sup>1</sup> during the Kuchma regime, and later on it was followed by a number of 'real integration' steps (e.g. the EU-Ukraine Action Plan with clear priorities and monitoring procedures). Ukraine will have to make another significant step towards the EU by signing the New Enhanced Agreement. This agreement, especially its part on free trade, will go beyond the liberalisation of trade in goods and services between the EU and Ukraine. It will primarily aim at adjusting Ukraine's regulatory policy and economic governance rules to those of the EU. Given the lack of EU membership prospects in the mid- and long-run, Ukraine must take as much as possible from what is being offered now. The Ukrainian officials and independent experts are now discussing the form of the future relations with the EU. They are trying to find the best formula for ensuring the domestic reform and instruments to modernise the country's economy. However, the public debate misses the connection with the reality as it primarily focuses on membership prospects for Ukraine and does not discuss any alternative to membership.

## 2. The Political Situation in Ukraine in the Aftermath of the Orange Revolution: The Context for Thinking 'European'

The Orange Revolution paved the way to democratic parliamentary elections in spring 2006. The Party of Regions gained 184 seats out of 450 seats, whereas the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYT) and Our Ukraine party gained 125 and 80 seats respectively. The coalition-building process took longer than it was expected in the West. The reason behind such a delay was the lack of experience in building coalitions and negotiating a policy agenda rather than bargaining for positions within the new government. The first attempt of coalition-building made by Our Ukraine, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) failed due to the unwillingness

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<sup>1</sup> Wolczuk, W. (2004), *Integration without Europeanization: Ukraine and its Policy towards the European Union*, Working Paper, Robert Schumann Centre, European University Institute, Florence.

of certain politicians to put the country's interests ahead, as well as due to various disagreements over a number of policy issues. Our Ukraine stood on more economically liberal, and pro-European, and pro-Euro-Atlantic position, whereas the SPU (and partially the BYT) advocated for free healthcare and education, a ban on the sale of land and abstention from NATO membership.

The collapse of the Orange coalition in July 2006 allowed for the appearance of a new 'Anti-Crisis' Coalition that was comprised of the Party of Regions, the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Communist Party of Ukraine. The coalition's agenda differed significantly from the president's agenda, especially in the foreign policy domain. However, a number of consultations between the President and different political parties resulted in an agreement of all political parties and in the signing of a Manifesto of National Unity. The Manifesto re-confirmed Ukraine's adherence to integration with the EU, co-operation with NATO and further domestic reform. The document was perceived as a victory of the president as it allowed all forces to agree on crucial issues. At the same time, its implementation remains problematic as the 'anti-crisis' coalition is making attempts to evade the implementation of certain points of the Manifesto (e.g. co-operation with NATO).

There are a number of foreign policy priorities that have been defined by the president and accepted by the new government, such as WTO accession, the normalisation of relations with Russia, further integration with the EU and co-operation with NATO<sup>2</sup>. All political parties agree with these priorities; however, each party interprets them in its own way.

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<sup>2</sup> However, the positions of the President Yuschenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych diverge over NATO. The President advocates for Ukraine's indisputable accession to NATO, whereas the Prime Minister has a more reserved opinion. During his last visit to Brussels, the Prime Minister stated that Ukraine was not ready to become a member and that the citizens of Ukraine would have to make their choice at the referendum. As we may see public opinion is used as a tool to slow down Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. At the same time, the government has not yet launched an information campaign on NATO/EU membership.

**Box 1.** Ukraine's Foreign Policy Priorities

These priorities are important for Ukraine's integration into the world's trade and economic systems as well as for the country's economic growth and development.

**WTO accession:** This process has lasted for almost 14 years. Ukraine is close to completing its bilateral negotiations with the members of the WTO working group.<sup>3</sup> There are no controversies on the importance of WTO accession for Ukraine. However, the political parties diverge on the terms and conditions of Ukraine's membership. For instance, the PoR and the SPU proposed transition periods for the protection of domestic producers to be ensured in the accession documents. The Parliament still has to adopt a number of important draft laws to secure Ukraine's accession.<sup>4</sup> WTO membership is a pre-condition for the beginning of negotiations on an EU-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement.

**Relations with Russia:** The previous governments (of Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuri Yekhanurov) have failed to develop an appropriate coherent policy towards Russia. The coalition government declared the transformation of relations with Russia from confrontation to 'pragmatic co-operation'. Many in the West perceived that as a threat to Ukraine's European integration and co-operation with NATO. By and large the rhetoric and the temperature of statements did change. However, it neither helped the new government negotiate a better gas deal, nor did it provide Russia with stronger leverage for further engagement of Ukraine into the Single Economic Space.

**Relations with the EU:** Surprisingly to many, the relations with the European Union remain stable. After a number of visits to Brussels and other Member State capitals paid for by the Prime Minister Yanukovych, the EU is keeping an open mind for the coalition government. European politicians and bureaucrats are waiting to see a mixture of pro-Russia and pro-EU rhetoric lead to deeper integration with the EU and more stable energy relations with Russia. "There has been a shift in Yanukovych [from his Kuchma days], not a huge shift, but a shift nevertheless and the EU should keep close ties with him to encourage this," a senior Czech diplomat stated. "There is understanding, especially in the new member states, that it is hard to cut ties with the old administration too quickly."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Kyrgyzstan remains the most problematic member of the working group. It expects Ukraine to pay the Soviet-era debts.

<sup>4</sup> It is difficult to provide an exact number of draft laws to be adopted by the Parliament as some of them are approved in first reading, some are adopted in the second reading, whereas there is number of draft laws that were adopted but they still have to be approved by the President.

<sup>5</sup> EU Observer, 22 November 2006 [<http://euobserver.com/24/22930>].

### 3. From the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement to the European Neighbourhood Policy: What Is in It for Ukraine?

#### 3.1. The EU-Ukraine Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA)

Ukraine was one of the first former Soviet Union countries to sign a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the EU in 1994. The agreement aimed at assisting the consolidation of the country's democracy and the development of its economy. It regulated the political, economic and cultural relations and the bilateral trade between the EU and Ukraine. The PCA came into force in 1998 only, as it took the Member States' parliaments almost four years to ratify the agreement.

By and large the structure of the PCA resembled the structure of the Europe Agreements between the EU and Central and Eastern European countries of the beginning of the 1990s. However, the PCA neither became a tool for modernisation of Ukraine's economy nor did it help facilitate the democratic transformation. The agreement was almost unconditional. Hence, it did not provide incentives for reform. A membership perspective was excluded, while the major PCA 'carrot' – a free trade area – was foreseen only upon full implementation of the agreement (in ten years). The implementation has been monitored separately and the results of progress assessment differed dramatically. For instance, the European Union was accusing Ukraine of applying discriminatory measures affecting EU business as well as of poor enforcement of PCA-related legislation; whereas the Ukrainian side reported the successful adoption of EU standards and norms in various spheres.

Ukraine sought integration with the EU without Europeanisation, i.e. without "extensive change of domestic institutions and policies in line with EU's more or less explicit targets".<sup>6</sup> Given that Ukraine's non-compliance with EU requirements bore no costs, the ruling elites failed to find incentives for the implementation of the PCA as well as for pushing domestic reform. The fear of ruling elites to have much more limited policy choices in the case of deeper integration with the EU outweighed the attractiveness of potential technical assistance and FDI flows, which could spring up if Ukraine was put on the accession track.

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<sup>6</sup> Wolczuk, W. (2004), *Integration without Europeanization: Ukraine and its Policy towards the European Union*, Working Paper, Robert Schumann Centre, European University Institute, Florence.

The EU-Ukraine relations have developed from partnership of the beginning of 1990s to a more advanced form of co-operation. A number of steps made by both sides allow us to conclude that Ukraine finally started moving towards ‘real integration’. The period of mutual dissatisfaction and disillusionment seems over now. The EU and Ukraine are concerned with larger problems, such as the institutional crisis, the slowdown of the economic growth in a number of old Member States, as well as a burden of further enlargement for the EU; whereas Ukraine has yet to find a model for its political and economic transformation.

### 3.2. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been developed as a framework policy for the relations with the whole EU neighbourhood, including Ukraine. The ENP is a rather vague, albeit flexible, framework that stretches beyond the existing relations and offers a possibility for deeper political relationship and economic integration. The major ‘carrot’ of the ENP is defined as a stake in the EU’s Internal Market in response to significant reform on the Ukrainian side. By and large, this ‘carrot’ should serve as an incentive for Ukraine’s compliance with the expensive EU *acquis*. Although an accession perspective was not offered, the ENP brought some positive developments, such as “light” conditionality attached to bilateral ENP Action Plans.<sup>7</sup> It was a mutually agreed document that set the agenda for country’s economic and political reform with clearly defined short- and medium-term priorities and a number of entry points for EU’s support. The progress of implementation is being monitored by the European Commission on a regular basis.

Given the short time span of the ENP, it is difficult to assess the impact of its conditionality on Ukraine’s transformation. However, it holds true that the ENP laid the foundation for Ukraine’s deeper integration with the EU. The inclusion of the political Copenhagen criterion into the AP paved the way for further democratisation. Regular monitoring of the Action Plan’s implementation in a manner similar to the Commission’s Regular Reports on accession countries can make the non-compliance more costly for the Ukrainian side. Moreover, another ENP ‘carrot’ – an EU-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement – may provide a tool for modernisation of country’s economy and its deeper integration with the EU.

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<sup>7</sup> The EU-Ukraine Action Plan was signed in spring 2005.

## 4. Ukrainian Public Opinion on the EU and Ukraine's European Choice

### 4.1. Overview

A brief explanation should be given prior to the description of what Ukrainian politicians, non-political elites, expert community, and the public at large think about the EU and Ukraine's integration with it. First of all it should be mentioned that the European integration is closely connected with the Euro-Atlantic integration in people's minds. Moreover, many Ukrainians (both politicians and the public) link and contrast European integration with country's relations with its Eastern neighbours, such as Russia and other CIS countries. Furthermore, the Ukrainian population perceives European integration as a foreign policy priority rather than a framework for domestic reform.

The opinion on Ukraine's foreign policy priorities could be divided into three following categories:

- those who support EU and NATO membership simultaneously,
- those who support EU membership but oppose NATO membership, and
- those who oppose EU and NATO membership.

At the same time, there are people who are sending mixed messages to the policy-makers as they support both Ukraine's membership in the EU and the country's participation in the union with Russia and Belarus (24% of the population).<sup>8</sup> There is also a group of people who advocate for a neutral status of Ukraine (the number of such vary). With these explanatory notes in mind, it is easier to understand the complexity of Ukraine's official line, the positions of the political parties, non-political elites and the public opinion.

### 4.2. The Official Position

The official position remains intact even after the victory of the Party of Regions in the last Parliamentary elections and the formation of the 'anti-crisis' coalition. The Prime Minister Yanukovich (as well as his coalition partners) signed the above-mentioned Manifesto of National Unity that contained a statement on Ukraine's adherence to European integration. In

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<sup>8</sup> Press releases of the National Institute of Strategic Studies.

accordance with the amended Constitution, the President has a right to define foreign policy priorities. He remains the main guarantor of the continuity of the country's pro-European path.

### 4.3. The Political Parties

According to political parties' programmes there is a clear line between the pro-Russian Party of the Regions (PoR) and the pro-Western Our Ukraine. The pre-election slogans of the PoR were based on the idea of closer ties with Russia, on granting the Russian language a status of a second official language, and on abstaining from NATO membership. However, the last few months illustrated the inconsistency between the pre-election declarations and post-election actions. First and foremost, a significant part of the PoR (e.g. businessmen turned into politicians) is interested in closer ties with the EU. It will open a door to the EU Internal Market for Ukrainian exporters and grant them access to cheaper resources.

The opinions of the parties diverge significantly when it comes to the country's relations with NATO. Our Ukraine party is the only party that fully supports Ukraine's membership in NATO. The Party of Regions and the Socialist Party advocate a referendum on NATO membership. The position of the BYT is not clearly identified. At the same time three parties out of five (PoR, SPU and the Communist Party) support Ukraine's neutral status.

On the one hand, all five parties have different opinions regarding Ukraine's participation in the Single Economic Space (SES).<sup>9</sup> However, all of them (except for communists) agree that 'a free trade zone' is the ultimate goal of Ukraine's participation within the EU as it may help increase trade flows with the neighbours. However, very few politicians are ready to endorse a customs union with Russia and CIS countries, as well as to transfer national power to a supranational body.

The results of the recent parliamentary elections led to a shift of public support to left-wing parties. The Communist Party and the SPU gained significant support. Both parties are members of the ruling coalition. Both have a pro-Russian orientation and are the opponents of Ukraine's membership in NATO and the EU (albeit to different extent). However,

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<sup>9</sup> The SES has been initiated by Russia in order to tie its former partners to the former Soviet Union. Russia idea stretches from the need to create an EEU free trade zone, followed by a customs and monetary union. The European Union is based as a model for the EEU.

voters' support of these parties should not be attributed to increasing support for pro-Russian and/or anti-NATO, anti-EU views. Such support can be explained by the disappointment with the economic difficulties of Ukraine's transformation process.<sup>10</sup> The centrist parties with a pro-EU orientation could get more votes during the last elections. However, the lack of public support could be attributed to the inability to come up with a solid common position and to form blocs with each other.

#### 4.4. Ukrainian Non-Political Elites

In brief, the position of non-political elites is shifting towards Euroscepticism, which is a response to a number of events of the last few years. The greatest disappointment with the EU was a lack of a response from the EU in the immediate aftermath of the Orange Revolution. The understanding of the lack of EU membership prospects in the short- and medium-term is reflected in debates of the elites over the future of Ukraine. Some say that Ukraine has no chance due to its large population and endless failures to implement the reform. Therefore, they expect that the European bureaucrats will oppose Ukraine's membership to avoid an additional workload. Others believe that Europeans lost their 'zeal' and became inert and incapable of renewal. Thus, there is no perspective of Europe's further development.

At the same time, the elites do not offer a clear and coherent strategy for Ukraine's relations with the EU, Russia and the US. The majority of experts agree with the formula most commonly used among the Ukrainian elite: "if we do not have membership prospects, we should focus on the benefits of the ENP and 'four freedoms' promised by the EU".

#### 4.5. The Mass Media

The local mass media is a primary source of any EU-related information for many Ukrainians (61.1%).<sup>11</sup> The second largest source of information is people-to-people contacts, which accounts for 36%.<sup>12</sup> However, it cannot be used to a full extent due to restrictions on the movement of Ukrainian citizens in the EU.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> The Results of Parliamentary Elections and their Possible Consequences for Ukraine Foreign Policy can be found at <http://www.niss.gov.ua/book/journal/Ukr2010.htm>

<sup>11</sup> An abstract from the analytical report of the Razumkov Centre at [www.uceps.kiev.ua](http://www.uceps.kiev.ua)

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Around 54% of Ukrainian citizens have been abroad.

Since 2005 the amount of information about the EU (e.g. the EU enlargement, the budget, the failure of the Constitution, institutional reforms, the accession of Turkey and the Balkans, etc.) and separate EU Member States (EU presidency, economic and political issues, attitude towards further enlargement) has increased both on television, the radio and in the printed/electronic press. This helps enlighten the Ukrainian public and provides topics for further public debate. When it comes to the EU-Ukraine relations, journalists primarily focus on the country's membership prospects. Very little attention is devoted to the consequences of the enlargement debate within the EU, the EU's current policy towards Ukraine and the assessment of possible benefits of the ENP for Ukraine.

The Ukrainian mass media does not provide enough materials – both in terms of quantity and quality – for a comprehensive awareness raising campaign. This can be explained by the lack of a government policy, the lack of contracts for the state-owned media, and the lack of incentives for the privately-owned media. Moreover, it can also be attributed to the much more event-rich internal politics of the last few years. Last but not least, Ukrainian journalists lack knowledge about the EU (e.g. its institutions, policies, and possibilities).

Partially, the latter problem is being tackled with the help of the Delegation of the European Commission in Ukraine through the support to Ukrainian journalists from Ukraine-wide and regional television and radio companies, printed press, Internet newspapers and information agencies for their short-term study visits to the EU institutions. However, there is a need for more advanced training for the Ukrainian journalists to turn them into an effective, impartial transmitter of the EU-related information.

#### **4.6. The Public Opinion**

The public debate reflects the growing euroscepticism and 'euroindifference' of some politicians and representatives of the non-political elite. The EU is perceived as a distant partner with alien problems. The majority of the Ukrainian population does not understand the EU's problems and concerns (e.g. enlargement fatigue, economic slowdown); the population remains an outsider of the European integration process.

**Table 1.** A Portrait of a Proponent and an Opponent of Ukraine's European Integration<sup>14</sup>

| Proponent   | Opponent  |
|---|---|
| Ukrainian by nationality  |   |
| Ukrainian-speaking person   | Ethnic Russian  |
| A citizen of western or central Ukraine                               | A citizen of eastern or southern Ukraine  |
| A citizen proud of his/her Ukrainian citizenship                      | A person who perceives him/herself a USSR citizen                                     |
| A person from a city or village with a population higher than 250,000 | A person from a small village, town   |
| A person of 20 to 40 years old  | An older person (27.6% – 50+ years old, almost 23% – in the group of 30-50 years old) |

In accordance with the Democratic Initiative Foundation (DIF), 56% of Ukrainians supported EU membership in 2000 and 2001, and 25% and 23% would vote for NATO membership in 2000 and 2001 accordingly. Only 10% and 8% of respondents were against Ukraine's membership in the EU; whereas NATO membership was opposed by 34% and 33% of Ukrainians in 2000 and 2001 accordingly.<sup>15</sup>

The results of DIF opinion poll in May 2004 revealed that 56% of Ukrainians still support the country's membership in the EU, and NATO membership was supported by 27%. However, the number of opponents of both the EU and NATO membership grew to 20% and 49% accordingly. This could be explained by the debates that preceded the 2004 Presidential elections. In 2005 the public opinion was still quite supportive of Ukraine's membership in the EU. Forty-four percent of the respondents were for the EU accession, 28% were against and 28% would abstain from partaking in the referendum.<sup>16</sup> The results of the opinion poll of the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS) are less optimistic: "the support for Ukraine's membership in the EU decreased from 55% in 2001, to 47% in 2005, and 43% in 2006".<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> The table draws heavily on the materials of the National Institute of Strategic Studies of 2005-2006.

<sup>15</sup> Press releases of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation at [www.dif.org.ua](http://www.dif.org.ua)

<sup>16</sup> The results of the opinion poll held by the Democratic Initiative Foundation in co-operation with Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on 4-15 February 2005. The results could be found at [www.dif.org.ua](http://www.dif.org.ua) in the DIF press release.

<sup>17</sup> "Ukrainian society". Sociological monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine (2005-2006).

The public support of EU membership remains to be a quite stable variable. However, the number of EU opponents is growing. Some explain this impact by the negative attitude towards Ukraine's membership prospect within the EU Member States. However, neither the statements of EU politicians nor the negative public opinion has had impact on the perception of Ukrainians. Moreover, the results of various opinion polls from the EU Member States (see Box 2 below) provide a 'rosy picture' of the European's attitude towards Ukrainians and the possibility of Ukraine's accession to the EU in the future.

**Box 2.** EU Public Opinion on Ukraine's Membership Prospects

Bertelsmann Stiftung Opinion Poll<sup>18</sup>: One in three Europeans believes Ukraine will be among the new members. When asked about the prospects for individual countries, only 37% think that Turkey will become a full member and 35% believe that Ukraine will achieve full member status. Only one in three Europeans, however, predict that Turkey or Ukraine will be among the new members. The majority of respondents believed that both countries would not join the Union by 2020. Only a handful of the respondents from the Central and Eastern Europe could envisage Turkey or/and Ukraine as EU members in fifteen years' time.

TNS Sofres Opinion Poll: A recent survey conducted by TNS Sofres showed that 53% of respondents from Germany were against Ukraine's accession, whereas 41% opted for it. In contrast, only 37% of French respondents were against Ukraine's membership versus 58% of those in favour. The opinion on Ukraine's membership differed significantly in Poland where 77% of those interviewed supported Ukraine's accession to the EU and only 12% were against. Spain and Italy represent an interesting case: 60% and 62% of the respondents (respectively) backed Ukraine's membership.

The decline of support for Ukraine's membership could be explained by the growing disappointment and disillusionment of the Ukrainian public over domestic institutions, political parties and separate politicians.

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<sup>18</sup> The Bertelsmann Stiftung survey was conducted in August and September 2006 throughout thirteen EU Member States by the opinion research institute tns/EMNID. It was a representative survey that polled over 10,000 people. The countries that took part in the survey represent 88% of the total EU population. The survey covered all geographic regions throughout the EU and included old as well as new members, net contributors and net recipients.

The public opinion is grounded on little knowledge about the EU. The costs and benefits of integration, and possible alternatives (e.g. integration without membership, all except institutions offered by the EU) are not clear to the public. Although it is frequently advertised in the Ukrainian society, the idea of European integration lacks a solid basis of knowledge in order to be deeply rooted in public perception. The discourse on European integration in Ukraine did not change in essence even with the shift of political elites. The initiatives of the EC Delegation in Ukraine, as well as the targeted activities of NGOs are not able to provide enough information. The government does almost nothing to feel this gap. Public information campaigns have failed both internally and externally.

One of the factors that did influence public opinion was the anti-NATO information campaign by a number of parties during the parliamentary elections on 2006. Some political parties (SPU, the Communist Party and others) claimed that the EU “did not want Ukraine”. Moreover, given the perceived connection between NATO and EU membership, the EU accession debate acquired additional negative connotations. Indirectly, the results of the parliamentary elections reflect the shift in public opinion; this was, however, more a choice driven by an internal political crisis, rather than by a shift in geopolitical orientation in the minds of ordinary Ukrainians.

## 5. The New EU Member States and Ukraine’s Membership Prospects

By and large, the new EU Member States are in favour of further EU enlargement and Ukraine’s deeper integration with the EU. Despite rather similar support for Ukraine’s European aspirations in the national capitals, the public attitude differs significantly. With the exception of Poland, the rest of the new Member States have not had a wide public debate on Ukraine’s place in the EU. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify the main patterns of the debate in these countries and explain the logic behind it.

The presence of a large Ukrainian diaspora and labour migrant group in the Czech Republic makes the debate over Ukraine’s future in the EU more intensive and controversial, whereas the debate in Slovenia (which lacks a Ukrainian diaspora) is quite moderate. The introduction of a visa regime between the Czech Republic and Ukraine influenced the creation of a negative

public attitude among Ukrainians. As a result, the number of Ukrainian tourists to the Czech Republic fell dramatically mainly as a consequence of the above-mentioned decision. Furthermore, people-to-people contacts between the Czechs and Ukrainians also decreased.

Neither the Czech Republic nor Slovenia has explicitly positioned itself as a regional leader in the enlarged EU (unlike Poland). Therefore, Ukrainians do not perceive the Czech Republic as a possible supporter or advocate of Ukraine's interests in the EU.

## 6. Conclusion

Ukraine has already materialised on the EU's map in the aftermath of the EU enlargement and the Orange Revolution. The possibility of the accession of Turkey and the Western Balkan countries raises the question of Ukraine's possible membership in the EU. On the other hand, Ukrainians have proven to adhere to democratic values, which remain the core issue in Europe. If the EU wants to maintain its role as an important global player and see the impact of its 'transforming power', it will have to find new forms of co-operation with Ukraine. A deep free trade between the EU and Ukraine could be the first step towards Ukraine's real integration.

The debate on Ukraine's European integration will continue. It will be influenced by the domestic politics (e.g. the sustainability of the coalition, its ability to deliver the promises, the increase of gas prices in 2006) as well as by the messages sent from Brussels and other Member States' capitals.

## Appendix 1. Public Opinion on Ukraine's Foreign Policy Priorities by Regions (in %)

**Table 1.** The Desirable Way of Ukraine's Development in 1994 (in %)<sup>19</sup>

|  | Western Ukraine | Central Ukraine | Southern Ukraine | Eastern Ukraine |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Through intensified co-operation with Western counties | 28              | 11              | 8                | 7               |
| Through co-operation within the CIS                    | 17              | 42              | 47               | 50              |
| Through orientation on Russia                          | 11              | 18              | 16               | 20              |
| Through use of the country's own resources             | 23              | 12              | 12               | 7               |

**Table 2.** The Desirable Way of Ukraine's Development in 2001 (in %)<sup>20</sup>

|  | Western Ukraine | Central Ukraine | Southern Ukraine | Eastern Ukraine |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Through intensified co-operation with Western counties | 27              | 13              | 11               | 5               |
| Through co-operation within the CIS                    | 11              | 18              | 17               | 18              |
| Through orientation on Russia                          | 2               | 5               | 8                | 11              |
| Through use of the country's own resources             | 37              | 20              | 19               | 11              |

**Table 3.** The Desirable Way of Ukraine's Development in 2005 (in %)<sup>21</sup>

|  | Western Ukraine | Central Ukraine | Southern Ukraine | Eastern Ukraine |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Through intensified co-operation with Western counties | 39              | 16              | 14               | 7               |
| Through co-operation within the CIS                    | 5               | 11              | 12               | 14              |
| Through orientation on Russia                          | 2               | 8               | 11               | 11              |
| Through use of the country's own resources             | 31              | 23              | 17               | 10              |

<sup>19</sup> Abstracts from <http://www.niss.gov.ua/Monitor/Monitor45/001.htm>

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.



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